Professore ordinario di Diritto pubblico comparato nell’ Università degli studi di Udine.
States of emergency naturally put constitutional systems under stress, regardless of whether they are explicitly codified or not. It goes without saying, however, that the fact of whether a constitution provides for a state of emergency is not without consequences in terms of dogmatic reconstruction. Indeed, while, on one hand, explicit constitutional provisions allocate power to constitutional bodies, govern the procedures to be used and determine whether and in what way rights can be limited, on the other, the absence of explicit provisions gives rise to a series of open questions concerning issues related to who is entitled to exert emergency powers, how broad these powers should be and how these powers should be exercised. In such cases, the impact of a break with day-to-day life may be far more problematic. Indeed, this break will probably bring out into the open the distinguishing features of a given legal system i.e. its strengths and weaknesses, its more or less consolidated structural elements as well as its other latent critical aspects.
This article will focus on the repercussions that an uncodified state of emergency may have on Italy’s structure of regional government with specific attention given to the healthcare system. The aim of this contribution is to prevent us from losing the thread of a debate concerning the need for a profound, deliberate and bipartisan rethinking of regional government. The need to retune and consolidate the notion of loyal collaboration, in terms of where and how this is implemented, should be at the center of our attention so to find a synthesis between unity and autonomy and thus attain an acceptable model of sustainable differentiation